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Abstract 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, the classic view of dispersed ownership as described by Berle and Means 
(1932) has gradually changed into a more diverse outlook on the manner in which the ownership 
of firms is structured.1 One form of concentrated ownership that prevails around the world is 
corporate blockholdership (La Porta et al., 1999; Langlois, 2013). In Europe, for example, more 
than half of the largest non-financial firms have a dominant corporate shareholder.2  
This type of ownership often results in the creation of business groups. In such groups the 
relations between member firms can take on various forms. At one end of the spectrum are more 
hierarchical structured groups, such as pyramids, where corporate ownership enables a large 
corporation to control a set of firms. At the opposite end, firms that pursue a common interest 
use corporate ownership to form informal associative groups where decision making is 
coordinated (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). All business groups, however, have the defining 
characteristic that their member firms ― also referred to as affiliates ― are separate legal entities 
that can access external financing, but at the same time also can obtain financing via the group’s 
internal capital market. This distinct organizational structure offers the opportunity to gain more 
insight into the functioning of internal capital markets by directly examining the debt policies of 
affiliates and the influence of internal capital markets on this decision-making process. Empirical 
evidence shows, for example, that the bank debt usage of domestic affiliates is driven by the same 
motives as for independent firms. However, for affiliates, the group’s internal capital market 
substantially decreases the necessity to obtain bank financing (Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010). 
Moreover, foreign affiliates of US multinational firms seem to substitute parental for external 
financing in response to conditions of the affiliate’s home market. More specifically, in countries 
with costly or limited availability of external borrowings due to weak creditor rights and 
                                                
1 A discussion of the tremendous amount of research that describes the ownership patterns around the world can be 
found in the survey of Denis and McConnell (2003).  
2 63.1% of the largest European firms have a dominant corporate shareholder using a full control criterion of 50%. 
This result is based on the 2013 Amadeus version of Bureau van Dijk. 
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underdeveloped capital markets, these foreign affiliates of US multinational firms borrow more 
from the parent firm and less from external sources (Desai et al., 2004). This raises the question 
whether the home market of the parent firm also affects the external debt usage of affiliated firms 
and in particular affiliates’ bank debt policies.3 It is well-known that business group membership 
influences affiliates’ access to bank financing as affiliates share in their parent firm’s reputation and 
parent firms often provide affiliates with guarantees that secure their bank borrowings (Chang and 
Hong, 2000; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000; Verschueren and Deloof, 2006; Manos et al., 2007; 
Jia et al., 2013). As parent firm location may affect these two factors and therefore affiliates’ bank 
debt policy, this study focuses on the impact of parent firm’s country of residence on affiliates’ 
bank debt ratios.  
To address this issue, we examine the bank debt ratios of affiliates that have a foreign 
parent firm and are located in one specific country. We use domestic affiliates as a benchmark in 
the analysis (i.e., affiliates that have a parent firm that is located in the same country). By 
considering affiliates that are all headquarted in the same country, we can study the influence of 
variations in parent firm location on affiliates’ bank debt, while implicitly controlling for various 
institutional and other aspects of the affiliates’ environment that might influence their bank debt 
usage. We limit the analysis to affiliates that are part of private business groups (cf. Hamelin, 2011) 
as this reduces the impact of external financing obtained via public capital markets.4 
Our study is related to several strands of the literature. First of all, we add to the literature 
on business groups’ internal capital markets. Prior studies have shown that group characteristics 
largely determine the design of affiliates’ external debt policy (see e.g., Manos et al., 2007; 
                                                
3 Although examining the impact of parent firm location on debt composition would be very interesting, in this paper 
we focus on bank financing because the financial statements and the notes to these statements allow us to cleanly 
identify the amount of financing obtained from banks. However, we are unable to disentangle the internal and external 
part for the remaining debt categories, such as trade credit. As an alternative, we could define an aggregate measure 
of external financing. Nevertheless, we focus on bank debt because it can be argued that asymmetric information is 
an important driver of the difference between domestic and foreign affiliates when accessing financing. The aggregate 
amount of external liabilities of course would be a mixture of different types of liabilities. As not all types of liabilities 
have the same underlying drivers (e.g., Fama, 1985), this would create noise. 
4 See Lin et al. (2011) for an analysis of the effect of  large shareholdings on the choice between bank debt and public 
debt. 
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Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010). We first confirm that the size and depth of internal capital 
markets play an important role in the bank debt policies of affiliates. Moreover, by focussing on 
affiliates that have a foreign parent firm, we provide more insights into the channels through which 
affiliation influences the access to bank financing. We provide clear-cut evidence that the 
nationality of the parent firm matters in accessing bank financing.  
 Second, this paper complements the growing literature that examines the influence of 
geographical distance on bank lending. Our focus differs from most of the papers in the literature, 
which mostly concerns domestic small business lending using transaction data (see e.g., Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) or, on a more aggregated level, international bank 
assets and liabilities (Buch, 2005). We demonstrate that geographical distance between the parent 
firm and the borrowing affiliate negatively influences the usage of bank financing in our sample of 
mature affiliated firms as well.  
 Third, this study contributes to the literature on the relation between the firms’ legal 
environment and debt-financing policies. Esty and Megginson (2003) provide evidence that the 
strength and enforcement of legal rules influence the structure of debt ownership within the 
context of syndicated loans. Desai et al. (2004) show the importance of host country legal rules for 
the debt policies of affiliates of US multinationals. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that debt policies are a function of the legal environment in which the firm operates. We document 
that for business group affiliates the relevant legal environment encompasses the parent firm’s 
home country as well.  
Previewing our main results, we find that affiliates with a foreign and domestic parent 
indeed differ with respect to their bank debt ratio: affiliates of foreign parent firms hold 9.6% of 
their total liabilities in the form of bank debt as compared to 16.2% for affiliates of domestic parent 
firms. The results are even more striking after controlling for various firm- and group-level 
characteristics, i.e., being controlled by a foreign parent firm decreases the relative use of bank 
debt by more than half. However, the question remains how characteristics of the parent firm’s 
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home market influence the bank debt ratios of affiliated firms. We find evidence that geographical 
distance between the parent firm and affiliate decreases bank debt. This finding may suggest that 
the monitoring services of banks are hindered and reputational effects reduced because of greater 
physical distance. Moreover, two other dimensions of distance negatively affect the bank debt 
ratios of affiliates, viz., cultural and legal distance. Affiliates, with a foreign parent, that depend on 
a different legal system or are located in a country with different cultural values than their parent 
firm have smaller bank debt ratios. This suggests that information asymmetries caused by cultural 
and legal differences hinder the access to bank financing as well. Finally, we document that the 
quality of legal enforcement in the parent firm’s home country has a positive influence on the bank 
debt ratio of affiliates indicating that guarantees from parent firms located in a country with a high 
quality of institutions are valued more highly. 
These results are obtained using a sample of Belgian affiliates that are part of private 
European business groups. The sample covers the period 1998-2007. We employ a dataset of 
Belgian affiliates as Belgium is ideally suited to investigate the financing policy of foreign business 
group affiliates. Belgium is a typical civil law country with a mature market economy where 
business groups are highly represented. La Porta et al. (1999) report that it has the highest presence 
of pyramidal structures and controlling shareholders of all industrialized countries. Moreover, large 
Belgian companies are obliged to provide information on intra-group transactions in the notes to 
the financial statements. Finally, Belgium is an open economy that attracts large amounts of foreign 
direct investments, resulting in a high presence of affiliates with a foreign - mostly European - 
owner.5  
                                                
5 The net inflow of FDI in 2011 amounted to 19.8% of GDP in Belgium, compared to 1.2% for Germany, 1.6% for 
France, 1.5% for the United Kingdom and 1.7% for the United States (Source: World Bank). The total inward FDI 
stock in Belgium is worth 1.932 times GDP (2011), compared to a European Union average of 0.418 and a worldwide 
average of 0.298 (Source: UNCTAD). 96.2% of the net FDI stock (2011) is provided by European investors (Source: 
National Bank of Belgium) 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an overview of the 
related literature and outlines the main hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
describes the data. Section 4 provides the main results and Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
(i) Geographical and Cultural Distance 
Although technological innovations have reduced communication and information costs, many 
empirical studies still indicate that information asymmetries increase with geographical and cultural 
distance. These two informational proxies remain important determinants of various dimensions 
of financial and product markets. Lerner (1995) indicates that geographical distance diminishes the 
board representation of venture capitalists due to higher monitoring costs. Within the US, Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999) provide evidence that mutual fund managers prefer to invest in 
geographically close or local headquartered firms because greater geographical proximity is 
accompanied by lower information asymmetries. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) extend their 
research by showing that these mutual funds’ investment strategies result in considerable abnormal 
returns. Huberman (2001) also finds evidence of geographically driven investment patterns within 
the portfolio choices of Regional Bell Operating Companies’ shareholders and attributes this to 
familiarity. Hau (2001) examines the influence of information asymmetries on trading profits 
within the German electronic trading platform Xetra and finds evidence of smaller profits for 
foreign traders. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) document that commercial real estate market 
participants try to overcome information asymmetries by investing in geographically proximate 
properties. Using a gravity model for international finance by Martin and Rey (2004), Portes and 
Rey (2005) show the importance of geographical distance on international equity flows putting 
strong emphasis on informational frictions as a sole driving force. Results of Freund and Weinhold 
7 
 
 
 
(2004) not only report a negative influence of distance on foreign trade growth, but also that the 
magnitude of this relationship is enhanced by the increase in internet usage.  
In addition to geographical distance, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that cultural and 
language similarities are important drivers in domestic portfolio decisions of Finnish investors. 
Huyghebaert et al. (2011) indicate that cultural distance also drives syndication within the more 
international setting of European buyouts. The authors show that the lead investor is more likely 
to syndicate, withhold a smaller fraction and invite a larger number of participants within the 
syndicate if the cultural distance with the target firm is higher. 
With respect to bank lending, banks have, as intermediates, a comparative advantage ― 
due to scale economies ― in decreasing information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
by actively monitoring the lent funds (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 
1985). The implementation of this task is hindered by greater physical and cultural distance. For a 
sample of small business loans in the US, Petersen and Rajan (2002) indeed find that banks are 
located significantly closer to their borrowers than nonbanks. Buch (2005) also finds support for 
this argument by documenting that distance has a negative impact on international asset and 
liability holdings of commercial banks and that this effect has not diminished over the years, except 
for the liabilities of French and US banks. Arena and Dewally (2012) show that US rural firms 
have an informational disadvantage compared to urban firms when they are located further from 
urban areas where most banks are located. This disadvantage results in higher spreads and a 
reduced willingness from prominent bank syndicates to underwrite their debt.  
We hypothesize that affiliates with a foreign parent firm are hindered by greater 
geographical and cultural distance between the affiliate and the parent firm in obtaining bank 
financing. Berger et al. (2003) show that foreign affiliates from 20 European countries 
predominantly borrow from banks that are headquarted in the same country as the affiliate.6 If 
                                                
6 In line with these findings, Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that concentrated ownership has a significant negative 
effect on the geographical distance between an affiliated firm and its bank. 
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geographical and cultural distances increase between the affiliate and the parent firm, business 
group affiliation may be less of an advantage when accessing bank financing. A first beneficial 
effect of group membership is that affiliates often receive guarantees from the parent firm, which 
facilitates the availability of bank financing (Chang and Hong, 2000; Ghatak and Kali, 2001; 
Verschueren and Deloof, 2006; Manos et al., 2007; Jia et al., 2013). However, greater geographical 
and cultural distance between parent firm and affiliate makes it more difficult for external local 
debt holders (i.e., banks) to monitor the actions of the parent firm in order to avoid possible 
conflicts due to asymmetric information (e.g., moral hazard problems, tunnelling). Second, 
affiliates can benefit from their parent’s reputation when accessing bank financing, (Chang and 
Hong, 2000; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000; Manos et al., 2012). Positive reputation effects 
may be reduced due to geographical dispersion and cultural differences. These arguments result in 
the following hypotheses:  
H1 (a): The bank debt ratios of foreign affiliates decreases with geographical distance between affiliated and parent 
firm. 
H1 (b): The bank debt ratios of foreign affiliates decreases with cultural distance between affiliated and parent firm. 
 
(ii) The Institutional Environment of the Parent Firm 
La Porta et al. (1998) document how countries and ― on a more aggregated level ― legal traditions 
show important differences with respect to investor rights (i.e., shareholders and creditors) and 
the enforcement of these rights (i.e., law and order). The authors develop indices that capture 
various aspects of these two dimensions of the legal environment and document that common law 
countries provide the strongest investor protection in terms of rights and Scandinavian civil law 
countries the highest quality of enforcement, while French civil law countries show the weakest 
index values.  
The legal environment as characterized by La Porta et al. (1998) proves to be an important 
driver of the size and depth of financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997), ownership concentration 
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(La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000), the valuation of firms (La Porta et al., 2002; Kalcheva 
and Lins, 2007), syndicated loans (Esty and Megginson, 2003), firms’ growth rates (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Levine, 1999; Wurgler, 2000), earnings management (Leuz et al., 
2003) and firms’ cash policy and the value of corporate cash holdings (Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira 
and Vilela, 2004; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Guney et al., 2007; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). With respect 
to affiliation, Desai et al. (2004) find that in countries with poor investor protection and 
underdeveloped capital markets, foreign affiliates of US multinationals substitute parental debt for 
more expensive and/or less accessible external financing.  
We conjecture that the legal environment of the parent firm’s home country plays a role 
in the bank debt policies of affiliates as well. Loan contracts typically contain two aspects, that is 
the financing contract and the security provisions (Esty and Megginson, 2003). As Berger et al. 
(2003) show that affiliates predominantly borrow in their own country, the financing contract 
between affiliates and their bank is, on average, expected to be governed by the law of the country 
where the affiliate is headquarted. Concerning the securitisation of affiliates’ loans, banks often 
demand guarantees from the parent firm when lending funds to affiliated firms. The security 
provisions that rest on the assets of the parent firm will in that case depend on the legislation of 
the parent’s home country. Therefore, if the affiliate belongs to a foreign parent, we expect loan 
contracting to become more difficult and costly, especially if the bank and the parent firm belong 
to two distinct legal traditions and/or the quality of rule of law of the parent firm’s country is 
weaker. First of all, bank lending to affiliates that reside in a country with a legal system that differs 
from the system of the parent firm’s home country, may be influenced by this difference in legal 
environments. It is well-known that loan contracts become more complex and hence more costly 
if the two aspects of the loan contract ― that is the financing contract and security provisions ― 
are governed by different laws and/or legal systems (Esty and Megginson, 2003). For example, 
Esty (2002) documents that one of the main challenges in the A2 Motorway investment project in 
Poland originated from legal differences between British common law and Polish civil law 
10 
 
 
 
concerning bank loans. A second factor that banks may take into consideration when lending funds 
to affiliates is the quality of the judicial system in the parent firm’s home market. If the affiliate 
belongs to a foreign parent, the legal enforcement of parent firm provided guarantees becomes 
more difficult and costly depending on the rule of law of the parent firm’s home country. 
Guarantees provided by the parent firm are less effective in enhancing access to external financing 
if the quality of rule of law of the parent firm’s home country is lower; that is if the country of the 
parent firm has a less efficient judicial system for resolving contractual issues, if risk of 
expropriation by the government is higher and/or if corruption is present in the parent firm’s 
home country. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are expected to hold: 
H2 (a): The bank debt ratios of foreign affiliates is negatively affected if affiliate and parent firm are governed by 
different legal systems in their home countries.   
H2 (b): The bank debt ratios of foreign affiliates is positively affected by the quality of the rule of law in the parent’s 
home country. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This section details the variable definitions used in the analysis.7 In addition, we provide an 
overview of the sample selection process and provide descriptive statistics and univariate tests.  
 
(i) Measuring Private Affiliates’ Bank Financing 
Following Hooks (2003) and Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2010) among others, we measure the 
amount of bank borrowings of affiliates as the ratio of bank debt to total liabilities.8 
                                                
7 Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed overview of the variables’ measurement. 
8 While indeed many Anglo-Saxon studies define their leverage ratio as total debt to total assets, Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicate that studies should include short-term liabilities, such as trade credit for 
example, in their leverage ratios if these liabilities are an important source of financing in a specific country or for 
certain classes of firms. As this is the case in Belgium (see e.g., Deloof and Jegers, 1999) and for private firms, we 
employ a broad leverage definition, that is the sum of long term liabilities and short term liabilities divided by total 
assets (see e.g., Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010 among others). Our leverage 
ratios are comparable to those found in other studies with similar definitions of leverage. For example, Rajan and 
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In order to assess the impact of the parent’s home country on the amount of bank 
financing available to affiliates, we consider two sets of variables. The first group of variables 
contains measures concerning the distance between affiliate and parent country. We measure 
geographical distance (GEODISTANCE) as the natural logarithm of the great-circle distance in 
kilometres between the capital cities of the affiliate and the parent firm countries (see e.g., Coval 
and Moskowitz, 1999). Besides physical distance, cultural differences between countries may also 
give rise to barriers when accessing bank financing. In this respect, Hofstede (2001) describes four 
dimensions in which countries can diverge from each other, namely power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Using the Hofstede (2001) country-scores for each cultural 
dimension, we measure cultural distance (CULTDISTANCE) as the natural logarithm of the 
Euclidean distance between these four cultural dimension-scores of the parent and affiliate 
country. 
The second group encompasses variables that relate to the legal environment of the 
parent’s home market. First, differences in legal systems between affiliate and parent country may 
explain variations in the bank debt ratios of affiliated firms. To be able to capture these differences 
in institutional environments, we use a dummy variable (LEGALDISTANCE1) that equals one if 
the parent and affiliate are located in countries with different legal systems on an aggregated level, 
that is common versus code law countries. As within Europe only two parent firm countries can 
be situated within the common law tradition (i.e., Great Britain and Ireland), we define a second 
dummy variable (LEGALDISTANCE2) that captures the variations in code law traditions (i.e., 
Scandinavian, French and German civil law). Second, the legal enforcement within the parent’s 
country is also expected to influence affiliates’ bank financing. We first use the legal enforcement 
index developed by Berkowitz et al. (2003) based on the legal enforcement variables of La Porta 
                                                
Zingales (1995) examine the capital structures of non-financial firms in the G7 countries and report total liabilities to 
total assets ratios that range from 57.8 % for the United Kingdom to 72 % in Germany. 
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et al. (1998) as a measure of the rule of law within a certain country (LEGALITY1).9 The La Porta 
et al. (1998) legal enforcement variables, however, have the drawback that they are constant over 
time. Therefore, we also consider four time-varying legal enforcement variables of Kaufmann et 
al. (2011), namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. The average correlation between pairs of these legality proxies amounts to 0.792. These 
high correlations would result in multicollinearity problems in the regression analyses. Therefore, 
we perform a principal component analysis for each year and retain the scores for the first principal 
component as an aggregated measure of legality (LEGALITY2). On average, the first components 
explain 91.56 percent of total variance.10 
Besides the main variables of interest, we also include a number of control variables at firm 
(i.e., affiliate) level that are expected to explain variations in bank debt ratios across firms.  
Size. Size is predicted to positively affect firms’ bank debt ratios as larger firms should 
incur lower relative costs in case of default (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Larger firms also have superior access to bank financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets corrected for inflation (SIZE).  
Tangibility. The use of tangible assets as collateral when obtaining bank loans reduces 
asset substitution problems as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and lessens expected 
default costs for the lender. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between tangibility and 
bank debt. Tangibility is proxied by the ratio of tangible assets and inventory to total assets 
(TANG).  
Profitability. According to the screening view of bank debt (e.g., Smith, 1987), the level 
of firm profitability provides a signal concerning the financial health of the firm. Firms with lower 
profitability are associated with having poorer financial health and higher default risk, and 
                                                
9 This index is the first component of a principal component analysis applied on the highly correlated individual legal 
enforcement variables of La Porta et al. (1998), that is efficiency of judiciary, rule of law, absence of corruption, risk 
of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation. The first principal component summarizes 84.6 percent of the total 
variance. 
10 Detailed information concerning the linear combinations used to calculate the PC-scores is available upon request. 
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therefore may be exposed to credit rationing. Consequently, higher profitability implies more bank 
debt. However, profitability may also influence bank debt in a negative manner. Low profitability 
may proxy for poor industry market conditions. In that case, firms with low profitability will find 
it valuable to renegotiate when needed and accordingly have higher bank debt ratios (Hooks, 2003). 
Moreover, private firms are faced with high information asymmetries, which may cause difficulties 
in accessing additional financing in times of low profitability. Consequently, the competitive 
advantage of banks to decrease information asymmetries by exercising monitoring services as 
described by Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), among others, 
allows private firms to obtain financing to overcome temporary shortages. Profitability is defined 
as the ratio of operating profit to total assets (PROFIT).  
Age. The effect of the firm’s age on bank debt is again ambiguous. The age of a firm can 
be expected to have a positive effect as it is often considered to proxy for firm reputation. As firms 
grow older, they may have established a more solid long-term relationship with lenders resulting 
in higher amounts of bank lending (Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). However, firm age 
can also negatively affect bank debt. Older firms may have accumulated more internal funds over 
time. As internally generated funds are accompanied by smaller information asymmetries than 
bank financing, the need for bank debt is reduced (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This effect may 
especially be true for private firms as internal financing and bank debt are the main sources of 
financing. Firm age is measured as the natural logarithm of the years since incorporation (AGE).  
Growth. Traditionally, firms with higher sales growth are expected to hold less bank debt. 
Growth opportunities are intangible and hence firms with more growth opportunities are faced 
with higher information asymmetries, resulting in higher capital constraints (Myers, 1977; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Moreover, high growth companies may prefer less bank financing because it 
brings pressure to meet future financial obligations that may hinder investments in positive net 
present value projects (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). However, higher growth may also signal 
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better financial health according to the screening view (Hooks, 2003) and, therefore, a positive 
relationship may be expected as well. Growth is measured as the annual sales growth (GROWTH).  
Cash. Firms that hold more cash on their balance sheets may prefer to use less bank debt 
to finance their activities. Cash is measured as the ratio of cash to total assets (CASH). 
Leverage. Following Hooks (2003) and Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2010) among others, 
we control for the firm’s decision concerning the total amount of debt financing by including the 
ratio of total liabilities to firm assets in the analyses (LEV).11 We consider total liabilities instead of 
long term debt as a proxy for leverage because short term financing is an important component 
of Belgian firm’s capital structures ― as indicated by Deloof (1998) among others ― and thus 
necessary to include (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
Finally, we include group-specific control variables that capture the size and depth of the 
group’s internal capital market. More specifically, we consider those variables that proxy for the 
group’s capacity to provide funding for affiliates or ease access to financing.  
Group size. If the size of the group increases, more funds should be available for intra-
group transactions. As internal financing is accompanied by smaller information asymmetries than 
bank debt, group size should negatively affect the bank debt ratios of affiliates (Gertner et al., 
1994; Stein, 1997; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010). However, within larger groups more assets-
in-place should be available to secure loans and larger groups could also be more diversified and 
have smaller default risks (Chang and Hong, 2000; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). These 
factors improve opportunities for groups to offer securities to affiliates and hence reduce the cost 
of debt for affiliates. Thus the size of the group may also positively drive bank debt. Group size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total group assets corrected for inflation (GROUPSIZE).  
                                                
11 As an alternative approach, an additional model could be specified to capture the choice of total debt financing and 
a simultaneous estimation could be performed. However, simultaneous-equation modeling is unnecessary if the system 
of equations is recursive, as is the case in our sample (Hooks, 2003). 
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Group profitability. Group profitability is expected to negatively affect the firm’s bank 
debt ratio because the higher the profitability at group-level, the more internal funds are available 
and the less attractive bank financing will become. The ratio of group operating profits to group 
total assets is employed as a measure for group profitability (GROUPPROFIT).  
Group age. Just as for group size, group age may proxy for the size of the internal capital 
market. As older groups may have accumulated more funds over time, group age may be negatively 
related to affiliates’ bank debt. Conversely, group age is often regarded as a proxy for reputation 
(Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). As affiliated firms share in their group’s reputation, 
affiliates belonging to older groups may also hold more bank debt (Chang and Hong, 2000). Group 
age is defined as the natural logarithm of the years since the groups’ incorporation (GROUPAGE).  
Group Cash. The amount of cash present within a group may also proxy for the size and 
depth of internal capital markets. Cash rich groups can be expected to have more funds at their 
disposal for intra-group financing purposes and thus show a reduced need for bank financing 
among their affiliates. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between group cash and 
affiliates’ bank financing. Group cash is measured as the ratio of total group cash to total group 
assets (GROUPCASH) 
Group Leverage. If internally generated funds are insufficient to finance activities and 
projects, private companies are forced to obtain external private financing to bridge this gap due 
to restricted choices of funds. Consequently, increasing levels of group leverage may reflect 
shortages in internal financing (Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010).12 Group leverage is proxied 
by the ratio of total group liabilities to total group assets (GROUPLEV).  
 
                                                
12 Note that group measures are based on the consolidated statements and accordingly are net of any intra-group 
transactions. Thus group leverage reflects the total amount of debt borrowed from external lenders. 
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(ii) Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
We collect accounting as well as ownership information for all private Belgian non-financial firms 
that filed unconsolidated complete annual accounts for at least four consecutive fiscal years from 
1998 until 2007.13 The unconsolidated data are obtained from Bureau van Dijk EP’s Belfirst 
database and enables us to employ information at firm-level. Using the ownership information, we 
select only those companies that are considered to be business group members (i.e., affiliates). 
More specifically, if the controlling company of the group holds more than 50% of the firm’s 
shares (directly or indirectly), the firm is classified as a business group affiliate.14 As European 
business groups are characterized by very high levels of ownership concentration, lowering the 
threshold to 20% (cf. Masulis et al., 2011) would entail a negligible effect on the number of firms 
identified as affiliates. Members of state-controlled business groups are excluded from the sample.  
Next, we augment the affiliate-level data with data from the consolidated financial 
statements of the affiliates’ controlling shareholder. We obtain the group-level consolidated data 
of all unlisted non-financial European business groups from the Amadeus database (Bureau van 
Dijk EP).15 Only operating affiliates with consolidated accounts available at group-level are 
considered for the analysis.16 However, some affiliates are the only or dominant operating affiliate 
                                                
13 Belgian firms are required to file complete annual accounts if more than 100 full time equivalent employees are 
employed or two of the following size criteria are met: total assets exceed 3.125 million euro, total operating revenue 
surpasses 6.25 million euro, the total number of full time equivalent employees is larger than 50. If these conditions 
do not hold, firms are allowed to file abbreviated annual accounts. 
14 Belgian Accounting Law considers control as owning more than 50% of the shares of the votes, or having common 
controlling shareholders who can appoint the majority of the board or can make strategic decisions. This control can 
also result from company bylaws, contracts or the existence of a consortium. 
15 Our dataset is restricted to European parent firms because of data limitations. Concerning potential parent firms 
from the Asian-Pacific region, only 78 groups file consolidated statements and have a Belgian affiliated firm. Recall 
that we only consider private parent firms as this allows us to cleanly establish the impact of foreign affiliation and the 
group’s internal capital market on affiliates’ bank debt ratio. Within the Asian-Pacific region, only five groups that 
have a Belgian affiliated firm are unlisted and file consolidated statements. As our sample selection procedure further 
excludes parent firms that can be considered as shell companies, state-owned business groups and other types of 
service companies, we are not able to construct a meaningful sample comprising affiliated firms with a parent firm 
from the Asian-Pacific region. Concerning affiliated firms with a parent firm from the African or American continent, 
we do not have access to the data regarding private consolidated groups. As for the Asian-Pacific parent firms, it is, 
however, very unlikely that it would result into a sample with a meaningful size. Especially regarding the United States, 
which has the largest group of Belgian affiliates, unlisted firms often do not publish detailed financial information. 
16 Although considering only groups that file consolidated statements could lead to a possible size bias, it guarantees 
that variables defined at group-level reflect economic reality as accurately as possible. As an alternative approach, 
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of the group. If this is the case, the controlling corporation is considered to be a shell company 
and affiliates controlled by such a firm are excluded (cf. Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006).17 
Following common practice, we omit firm-years with zero sales and extremely high leverage levels 
(i.e., above 100% of total assets). Firms active in utilities and several categories of service 
companies are left out as well because of the specific nature of their activities.  
Finally, to be able to assess the influence of the parent firm’s home country, we construct 
two final samples: a sample containing Belgian affiliates that are controlled by a foreign parent firm 
(i.e., foreign sample) and a benchmark sample containing Belgian affiliates with a Belgian parent 
firm (i.e., domestic sample). This selection process results in a foreign sample of 723 affiliates part 
of 581 groups (1,901 firm-years) and a domestic sample of 1,817 affiliates part of 647 groups (5,205 
firm-years). In order to improve comparability across samples, both samples are matched on 
industry (two digit NACE-BEL industry codes) and size (average deflated total assets) reducing 
the domestic sample to 723 affiliates, part of 367 groups (2,086 firm-years).18 All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. 
  
----------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------ 
  
Table 1 shows the geographical and industry distribution in absolute numbers and in 
percentages for the domestic affiliate and foreign affiliate samples. The parent firms of the 723 
                                                
Manos et al. (2007) and Chang and Hong (2000) calculate the group variables as the average weighted value of the 
individual business group affiliates’ variables and thus avoid the use of consolidated accounts. This methodology is 
most likely to lead to information quality problems for our sample of private firms and thus is not the preferred 
approach for this study. 
17 A consolidated firm is reclassified as a shell company if the firm’s average financial fixed assets to total assets is 
equal to or larger than the 95th percentile and the average sales to total assets is equal to or smaller than the 5th 
percentile. 
18 As our samples consist of Belgian Affiliates, we use the Belgian version of the European NACE activity codes (i.e., 
NACE-BEL). 
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affiliates of the foreign sample are located in 11 different countries with the majority of parent 
firms headquarted in the neighbouring countries, namely The Netherlands, France and Germany.19 
The highest average bank debt ratio can be found for The Netherlands, followed by Italy and 
Sweden. Affiliates with foreign parents are mainly active in trade, followed by manufacturing. The 
amount of bank debt held relative to total liabilities is the highest in agriculture and foods for both 
the domestic and the foreign sample, though much smaller in magnitude for the latter type of 
affiliates.  
 
----------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------ 
 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the continuous variables used 
in the subsequent analyses. We report all statistics for the sample of affiliates that have a foreign 
parent firm and for the benchmark sample of affiliates with a domestic parent firm. The median 
and mean bank debt to total liabilities ratio, (BANKDEBT) of the foreign sample are significantly 
smaller than those of the domestic sample. The total amount of leverage to total assets ratio (LEV), 
however, does not differ between both samples for the median and mean values. Since affiliates 
can substitute bank debt for debt obtained via the internal capital market − that is internal debt − 
considering the mean and median internal debt ratios for both samples might provide useful 
                                                
19 Note that the sample comprises a high amount of parent firms from the Netherlands as compared to other 
European countries. There are several factors that may have a positive effect on the number of Dutch parent firms in 
our sample. First, the fiscal consolidation of Dutch business groups and the historically strong ties between the 
Netherlands and Belgium arising from the Benelux union − in particular concerning economic policy, justice and 
internal affairs − makes it particularly attractive for Dutch parent firms to have Belgian affiliated operating firms as 
compared to parent firms from other European countries. Moreover, as a result of these close ties, an important 
number of double-taxation treaties have been concluded with Belgium. Note that we effectively omit shell companies 
from the analysis and we also exclude parent firms identified as Dutch cooperative holding companies and Dutch 
administrative foundations (i.e. “Nederlandse stichting”). As a robustness test, we omit Dutch parent firms from the 
analysis (see subsection 4.iii Additional Tests and Robustness). 
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insights. Internal debt ratio is defined as the ratio of internal debt to total liabilities. We observe 
that affiliates with a foreign parent firm have significantly higher internal debt ratios than their 
domestic counterparts. These descriptive findings suggest that affiliates with a foreign parent face 
greater costs when accessing bank financing and therefore, prefer to finance a larger proportion 
of their activities with internal debt.20 After matching, we observe no difference between both 
types of affiliates with respect to firm size (SIZE). However, the remaining firm characteristics 
differ significantly between both samples. Affiliates with a foreign parent have less tangible assets 
(TANG) than their domestic counterparts, but show higher profitability ratios (PROFIT). In 
addition, affiliates of the foreign sample are slightly older (21 years vs. 18 years for the domestic 
sample at median level) (AGE), have smaller growth rates (GROWTH) and hold larger amounts 
of cash on their balance sheets (CASH). Turning to the group characteristics, foreign groups are 
larger than Belgian groups in our sample (GROUPSIZE).21 The comparison of firm size and group 
size illustrates that the median affiliate is relatively small within the group, but large enough to be 
of importance. Furthermore, foreign groups tend to be slightly more profitable 
(GROUPPROFIT), older (26 years vs. 17 years for the domestic sample) (GROUPAGE) and 
somewhat less cash rich (GROUPCASH) and leveraged (GROUPLEV). Finally, we report the 
median and mean values of the continuous distance metrics and legality variables. 
 
 
4. MAIN RESULTS 
(i) Firm- and group-level determinants of bank debt  
Before we assess whether the parent firm’s country location affects the bank debt ratios of 
affiliates, we perform some preliminary estimations where we only include firm- and group-level 
                                                
20 Whether or not internal debt usage by affiliates affects bank debt ratios is considered in Section (4.iii) 
21 Domestic groups are among the largest firms in their industry. However, in our sample, foreign groups still turn out 
to be almost 2.5 times larger than their domestic peers. Therefore, in Section (4.iii) we conduct an additional robustness 
analysis where we include group size in the matching procedure.  
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characteristics. This approach enables us to directly compare results and offers the opportunity to 
evaluate how these determinants affect the bank financing of affiliates of foreign groups, without 
taking the parent firm’s location into account.  
Table 3 reports these base equations. All equations are estimated using Tobit regressions 
because a large part of the observations have a value of zero for the dependent variable (46% for 
the domestic sample and 62% for the foreign sample).22 All equations include industry and time 
dummies.23 The standard errors are robust for group-level clustering. As mentioned above, most 
firm-level characteristics are also determinants of leverage. Following the literature, we therefore 
regress leverage on the other firm-level variables and use the residuals as an instrument for leverage 
(Johnson, 1997; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010).24 For group leverage we use a similar 
approach with regard to the group-level variables. Because most group-level characteristics are also 
determinants of group cash (see e.g., Opler et al., 1999), the same method is applied for group 
cash. 
 
----------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------ 
 
Columns 1 and 3 reveal that all firm characteristics significantly determine the bank debt 
ratios of domestic and foreign affiliates, respectively. The majority of signs of the estimated 
                                                
22 We employ Tobit regressions because this estimation technique incorporates both the firm’s decision to use bank 
debt and the amount of bank debt firms hold. As an alternative, we could employ a two-step approach: a first step 
with logit or probit models that predict the probability of using bank debt and a second step that estimates the 
determinants of bank debt for those firms with positive amounts of bank debt on their balance sheets. The results 
show that the determinants that drive the bank debt decisions of affiliates are virtually the same as those variables that 
drive the amount of bank debt financing.  
23 To improve comparability with regression models that include variables that are constant over time for each affiliate 
(e.g., foreign dummy and distance measures), we opt to report the results with industry dummies. Nevertheless, the 
results remain qualitatively unaffected with fixed effects estimation techniques. 
24 Although this is a frequently used approach in the accounting and finance literature, it should be noted that it also 
has a drawback as it causes the common explanatory power to be reflected in the non-orthogonalized independent 
variables (Christie et al., 1984). 
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coefficients are the same for both samples. First, larger affiliates use higher amounts of bank debt. 
This finding is consistent with the view that larger firms face smaller borrowing costs because of 
lower default risks. Moreover, as predicted, affiliates with more tangible assets use more bank debt, 
because these assets can serve as collateral. In addition, we observe that affiliates’ profitability 
negatively affects bank debt. Within the domestic sample, bank debt decreases with firm age. This 
result suggests that older firms have more internal funds available that lessen the need for bank 
financing, because these internal funds are accompanied by smaller information asymmetries 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, for affiliates that have a foreign parent firm the bank debt 
ratios increase as these affiliates’ age increases, consistent with the reputation view. Furthermore, 
we also observe differences in the effect of sales growth on bank financing between both samples. 
Sales growth does not seem to explain the bank debt ratios of domestic affiliates, though foreign 
affiliates’ bank debt ratios are positively affected. The latter finding supports the view that higher 
sales growth is seen as a signal of better financial health. Furthermore, in both samples more cash 
rich and less leveraged firms have smaller bank to total liabilities ratios.  
Next, we consider the impact of group-level characteristics. All group variable coefficients 
show similar signs for both samples. The results indicate that affiliates of larger, more profitable, 
older and more cash rich groups hold less bank debt. These findings provide support for the 
argument that these group characteristics predominately reflect the availability of resources within 
the groups’ internal capital markets. Group leverage positively affects the firms’ bank debt ratios, 
indicating that group leverage proxies for shortages in internal financial resources.  
Besides these four group characteristics, there may be other group-specific factors that 
have an influence on the bank debt ratios of affiliates and/or affect the earlier presented 
estimations. To control for these effects we include group dummies in Column 2 for the domestic 
sample and in Column 4 for the foreign sample. Most firm-level variables remain significant and, 
except for group cash in the domestic sample and firm age in the foreign sample, show the same 
signs. Within the domestic sample, this result suggests that after controlling for time invariant 
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group heterogeneity the availability of (pledgeable) liquidities within the group facilitates access to 
bank lending by affiliates that are located in the same country as the parent. Within the foreign 
sample, age negatively drives bank debt as is the case for domestic affiliates. This result indicates 
that after controlling for time invariant group heterogeneity, the decreased need for bank financing 
caused by a higher availability of internal funds when firms get older (as predicted by Myers and 
Majluf (1984)) holds for affiliates with a foreign parent firm as well.   
Finally, we estimate the baseline model with all firm- and group-level characteristics for 
the full sample containing both types of affiliates. The results are reported in Column 5. In order 
to compare the bank debt ratios of both samples while controlling for firm and group 
characteristics, we include a dummy variable that equals one if the affiliate has a foreign parent 
firm. The estimated coefficient indicates that affiliates of a foreign parent firm, ceteris paribus, 
hold bank debt ratios that are 8.7% lower than the ratios of affiliates in the domestic sample. This 
result confirms the univariate findings.  
  Taken as a whole, the first set of results are in line with findings in the literature and show 
that the bank debt ratios of affiliates with a foreign parent are mainly driven by the same motives 
as domestic affiliates. 
 
(ii) Parent Firms’ Home Country Effects: Distance and the Legal Environment 
In this subsection, we consider the implications of parent firm location on the bank debt ratios of 
affiliates. Table 4 presents the results of the extended analysis that incorporates distance and legal 
environment variables in the Tobit estimations.  
 
----------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------ 
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First, we evaluate the impact of geographical proximity in Column 1. Geographical 
distance is highly significant and shows a negative effect on bank debt. This finding is in line with 
our hypothesis H1(a) and is consistent with the view that information asymmetries increase and 
reputation effects diminish if the parent firm is located further away. In addition, in line with 
hypothesis H1(b), the estimations of Column 2 indicate that cultural differences also negatively 
affect the usage of bank debt financing by foreign affiliates. To test whether geographical and 
cultural proximity capture similar dimensions of asymmetric information and reputation we 
include both variables in Column 3. We observe that this is not the case: bank debt ratios of 
affiliates with a foreign parent are negatively influenced by both geographical and cultural distance.  
Next, we introduce the first legal distance variable that measures the impact of differences 
in legal systems between the parent and affiliate country on an aggregated level (Column 4). 
Supportive of hypothesis H2(a), affiliates of foreign parent firms have relatively smaller bank 
borrowings if the parent firm resides in a common law country and the affiliate in a code law 
country (and vice versa). As there is a considerable amount of variation in legislation between code 
law countries (La Porta et al., 1998), we allow the legal distance variable in Column 5 to capture 
the various code law legal traditions as well. The coefficient remains negative and highly significant 
confirming that legal differences between countries also create information asymmetries that 
hinder bank financing. According to hypothesis H2(b), another aspect of the parent’s home market 
that may influence the use of bank debt by affiliates is the quality of legal enforcement. Both legality 
variables (Columns 6 and 7) show a highly significant positive effect on affiliates’ bank debt ratios: 
the poorer the legal enforcement within the parent firm’s country, the less bank debt is used by 
affiliates with a foreign parent. This suggest that guarantees received from the foreign parent firm 
are valued less when the legal enforcement in the parent firm’ country is poorer. All possible 
combinations of the legal distance and legality variables give the same results (not reported).  
The model presented in Column 8 includes both the distance and legal environment 
variables. Although the second legal distance dummy allows for more variation in legal systems, 
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we opt to include the first legal distance variable because the second measure is highly collinear 
with geographical distance (ρ = 75%). The second legality proxy is preferred because this variable 
is time variant, though the results remain the same if the first legality variable is employed. The 
estimated coefficients remain highly significant with the same signs. 
Overall, the results indicate that geographical, cultural, and legal distance between affiliates’ 
and parent firm’s countries and the legal enforcement of the parent’s country affect affiliates’ bank 
borrowings. 
 
5. ADDITIONAL TESTS AND ROBUSTNESS 
(i) Industry Related Characteristics: Core Affiliates and Diversification 
The results presented above could be reflecting underlying differences concerning industry related 
characteristics. First, affiliates that are active in a non-core industry of the group may more easily 
be divested and therefore be treated differently. To test the robustness of our results, we added a 
dummy variable (CORE) to the analysis that takes the value of one if the primary activity of the 
affiliate is equal to the primary activity of the group using the three digit USSIC industry scores 
(Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006; Locorotondo et al., 2014). The results are presented in Table 
5. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant indicating that core affiliates indeed rely less 
on bank financing. The inclusion of this variable, however, does not change the other results.  
Second, if diversified firms have more stable cash flows, the diversification level of firms 
may have a positive effect on their bank borrowing capacity. Therefore differences in 
diversification levels across types of affiliates could provide an alternative explanation for our 
results: affiliates having a domestic parent firm may be more diversified and thus borrow more 
from banks. We proxy for the affiliates’ diversification level by considering the number of industry 
categories the firm discloses based on the three digit primary USSIC industry codes (DIV) and 
added this variable to Table 5. Affiliates that are active in a higher number of industries indeed 
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borrow more. We find the same results if we employ a variable that is based on the two digits or 
full industry codes. After controlling for the diversification level of affiliated firms, affiliates with 
a foreign parent still have, on average, smaller bank debt ratios. The bank debt ratios of foreign 
affiliates continue to be negatively influenced by the distance with the parent firm in all its 
dimensions and positively by the quality of rule of law of the parent firms’ home country. 
 
----------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
------------------------ 
 
(ii) Country Related Factors: The Dutch Parent Firm Effect, International Tax Considerations and Country 
Specific Effects. 
Next, we test the robustness of our results concerning several country related factors. An 
important part of the foreign sample consists of affiliates that have a Dutch parent firm. To assess 
whether our findings hold without these affiliates, we re-estimate the model containing all distance 
and legal enforcement variables. All distance measures show a negative and highly significant sign 
in both equations. The degree of legal enforcement with the parent’s country continues to have a 
positive influence on bank debt usage of affiliates as well.  
As Huizinga et al. (2008) demonstrate our results could also be influenced by international 
tax considerations with respect to cross border dividend and interest payments. Based on the 
Huizinga et al. (2008) algorithm, we calculate the effective tax rates for cross-border dividend and 
interest payments. These variables do not have a significant effect on affiliates’ bank debt ratios in 
our sample.  
Additionally, in order to control for additional country effects, we re-estimate the baseline 
model with country-specific dummies in the foreign sample. The results remain unchanged. These 
26 
 
 
 
country dummies only can be included in the base regressions because of collinearity issues with 
the foreign dummy and the country specific variables.  
To check the sensitivity of our results for general economic and credit market conditions 
of the parent firm’s home market in all of the analyses, we include government yield spreads 
(YIELDSPREAD) in table 5 (Source: Eurostat). Yield spreads are defined as the difference 
between the 10 year government yield of the parent firm’s home country and the 10 year German 
government yield. These spreads are significantly related to the bank debt ratio, with a negative 
sign. If yield spreads would be a proxy of relative financing costs, a positive relationship could be 
expected: lower yields in the parent home country would likely lead to a lower use of bank debt in 
the affiliate’s country. A potential explanation for the negative relationship is that spreads proxy 
for the reputation of the parent firm’s country. Higher yields indicate a worse reputation, which 
may reflect on the foreign affiliate when accessing bank financing in its own home market. The 
same findings hold when using the government yields instead of spreads and the annual average 
interest charged to non-financial corporations in the parent firm’s home country (Source: ECB). 
Including these yields does not change our results. 
 
(iii) Endogeneity Issues: Substitutability of Internal Debt and the Decision to Invest Abroad 
In addition to industry and country specific issues, some biases may also affect our findings. First 
of all, as parent provided debt entails fewer conflicts of interest because of its owner-provided 
nature (see Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2010), affiliated firms with a foreign parent may substitute 
bank debt for internal debt to overcome factors that hinder access to bank financing. Therefore, 
we also estimate the equations of Table 4 including the internal debt ratios to control for the 
substitutability between internal and bank financing following Desai et al. (2004). Because bank 
and internal debt ratios are jointly determined, internal debt is instrumented using the corrected 
creditor rights index drawn from Djankov et al. (2007) of the parent firm’s home country and one-
period lagged internal debt. The creditor rights index is a suitable instrument as it positively 
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influences the amount of private resources available to the parent firm that can be channelled 
through the internal capital market in the form of debt and is therefore exogenous to the firm. The 
F-tests of significance of the first-stage equations all reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. 
Regression based tests are not able to reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. We also 
considered the amount of private credit available in the parent’s home country as a possible 
instrument, but it was found to be exogenous and invalid. After controlling for the substitutability 
of internal and bank debt financing using IV Tobit regressions, the results remain qualitatively the 
same. 
Furthermore, an additional bias may arise because drivers of the decision to invest abroad 
could influence the estimated difference between domestic and foreign affiliated firms. 
Consequently, we re-estimate the base models using the Heckman selection procedure. Following 
Grubaugh (1987) and Mudambi and Mudambi (2002) among others, we select size, age, and the 
intangibility ratio (i.e., intangible assets to total assets) at both affiliate- and group-level for the first 
stage selection equation as these variables are the prime determinants of foreign direct investment. 
Note that affiliate-level and group-level intangibility are used as instruments as they do not appear 
in the second stage regression. We also control for industry and year fixed effects. The results of 
the second stage regression, in which the inverse Mills ratio captures this possible selection bias, 
are comparable to those reported. Moreover, we also re-estimate the models using lagged 
independent variables to control for simultaneity issues. The results do not change.  
 
(iv) Further Robustness: Language and Propensity Score Matching 
We also considered the possible effect of language differences as, besides geographical and cultural 
distance, these differences may also increase costs. Language, however, does not seem to 
significantly influence foreign affiliated firms’ bank debt if included alongside geographical and 
cultural distance. Finally, we use group size as an additional criterion to match every foreign 
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affiliated firm with a domestic affiliate and also apply an alternative matching procedure, namely 
propensity score matching. Again, results remain qualitatively the same.25 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the bank debt policies of affiliates of private foreign multinational groups. 
We extend the existing literature by showing that the relevant environment that drives bank debt 
policy of affiliates comprises not only the host market of the affiliate itself, but also the home 
market of the parent firm.  
We find that foreign affiliated firms’ bank debt usage is driven by mostly the same 
economic rationales as those of affiliates with a domestic parent firm, both at firm and group-level. 
Nevertheless, the bank debt ratios of foreign affiliates is about half the size of the bank debt ratios 
of affiliates of domestic business groups, after controlling for various firm- and group-level 
characteristics.  
Therefore, we explore several channels through which the variation in parent firm country 
may affect the bank debt policy of affiliates. First of all, the findings show that distance ― in several 
dimensions ― between the parent firm and the affiliate home country negatively affects bank 
borrowings of affiliates suggesting that distance increases information asymmetries, limiting access 
to bank financing. Geographical and cultural distance does not facilitate the monitoring services 
provided by local banks and may hamper the potential positive influence of parent firm reputation 
in obtaining bank borrowings. Differences in legal traditions complicate loan contracts and hence 
raise barriers in accessing bank financing as well. Furthermore, the results reveal that poorer legal 
enforcement in the parent firm’s home country diminishes bank financing for affiliates that are 
                                                
25 All results from the robustness tests are available upon request. 
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headquarted in a different country. This suggests that banks value parent firms’ guarantees 
according to the quality of legal enforcement in the country of the parent firm.  
Overall, this paper also offers evidence that parent firms located at smaller distances and 
in countries with a good legal enforcement can more easily leave the financing of operations to 
their local affiliates and have a lower need to provide funding from the group's internal capital 
market. One interesting avenue for further research may therefore lie in examining whether or not 
the affiliates of this type of business group play a more active role in the bank debt policy of the 
group as a whole. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1 
Variable Definitions  
Variables Definitions 
BANKDEBT Bank debt / total liabilities 
CASH Cash / total assets 
CULTDISTANCE The natural logarithm of the Euclidean distance between the four Hofstede (2001) 
cultural dimensions of the country of the affiliate and the parent firm: Power distance, 
Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty avoidance 
FOREIGN Dummy variable: 1 if the affiliated firm has a foreign parent firm; 0 otherwise  
GEODISTANCE The natural logarithm of the great-circle distance in km between the capital cities of the 
affiliate and the parent firm countries, Latitudes and longitudes obtained from: 
http://geography.about.com/od/locateplacesworldwide/Locate_Places_Worldwide.ht
m 
GROUPAGE Ln(group age)  
GROUPCASH Group cash / group total assets 
GROUPLEV (Group ST liabilities + group LT liabilities) / group total assets 
GROUPPROFIT Group operating profit / group total assets 
GROUPSIZE Ln(total group assets corrected for inflation) 
GROWTH  Salest/salest-1 
INTERNALDEBT Internal debt / total liabilities 
LEGALDISTANCE
1 
Dummy variable: 1 if the parent firm is located in a country with a different legal tradition 
Two different legal traditions are considered: common law and civil law 
LEGALDISTANCE
2 
Dummy variable: 1 if the parent firm is located in a country with a different legal tradition. 
Four different legal traditions are considered: common law, Scandinavian civil law, 
German civil law, and French civil law. 
LEGALITY1 Legal enforcement index developed by Berkowitz et al. (2003) by performing a principal 
component analysis on the La Porta et al. (1998) legal enforcement variables. 
LEGALITY2 Legal enforcement index developed by performing a yearly principal component analysis 
on four of the Kaufmann et al. (2010) dimensions of legal enforcement: government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  
LEV (ST liabilities + LT liabilities) / total assets 
LOGAGE Ln(firm age)  
PROFIT Operating profit / total assets 
SIZE Ln(total assets corrected for inflation) 
TANG (Net tangible assets + inventory) / total assets 
Notes: 
This table provides definitions for the variables used in the analysis. Each variable is computed for each firm-year. 
The firm-level characteristics are based on unconsolidated financial statements data of 1446 affiliates. The group-level 
characteristics are calculated using data from consolidated statements of 1228 groups.
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Table 1 
Sample Composition and the Average Bank Debt Ratio by Country and Industry 
  Domestic Sample   Foreign Sample 
    n [%] Bank debt   n [%] Bank debt 
Parent Home Country       
Belgium  723 [100%] 0.162 [0.231]   - - 
Austria  - -   2 [0.28%] 0.012 [0.013] 
Germany  - -   54 [7.47%] 0.035 [0.096] 
Denmark  - -   34 [4.7%] 0.055 [0.144] 
Spain  - -   9 [1.24%] 0.048 [0.116] 
Finland  - -   5 [0.69%] 0.023 [0.065] 
France  - -   81 [11.2%] 0.102 [0.203] 
Great Britain  - -   27 [3.73%] 0.040 [0.123] 
Ireland  - -   5 [0.69%] 0.028 [0.048] 
Italy  - -   30 [4.15%] 0.036 [0.119] 
The Netherlands  - -   446 [61.69%] 0.108 [0.197] 
Sweden  - -   30 [4.15%] 0.132 [0.272] 
            
Industry            
Agriculture & food  37 [5.12%] 0.208 [0.222]   37 [5.12%] 0.136 [0.207] 
Manufacturing  161 [22.27%] 0.172 [0.204]   161 [22.27%] 0.089 [0.155] 
Construction  21 [2.9%] 0.143 [0.240]   21 [2.90%] 0.043 [0.115] 
Trade   348 [48.13%] 0.157 [0.234]   348 [48.13%] 0.093 [0.187] 
Transportation  79 [10.93%] 0.151 [0.251]   79 [10.93%] 0.097 [0.207] 
Services  77 [10.65%] 0.153 [0.258]   77 [10.65%] 0.119 [0.251] 
       
Notes: 
This table provides the geographical and industry composition for the sample of domestic affiliates (i.e., Belgian 
affiliates of a Belgian parent firm) and the sample of foreign affiliates (i.e., Belgian affiliates of a foreign parent). The 
first column for each sample shows the number of firms by each category, the second column shows the average bank 
debt ratio by each category with standard deviation between brackets. Bank debt is winsorized at 1%. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
      Median [Min;Max]  Equality test Mean [StDev]  Equality test 
Variable domestic foreign   domestic foreign   
              
Firm specific characteristics             
BANKDEBT 0.011 0.000 (10.936)*** 0.162 0.096 (9.85)*** 
  [0; 0.840] [0;0.841]   [0.231] [0.189]   
INTERNALDEBT 0.14 0.28 (-7.490)*** 0.258 0.324 (-7.22)*** 
  [0;0.992] [0;0.938]   [0.292] [0.289]   
              
SIZE 8.72 8.55 (0.771) 8.64 8.6 (-0.12) 
  [4.63;12.13] [4.928; 12.555]   [1.522] [1.621]   
TANGIBILITY 0.294 0.254 (4.912)*** 0.328 0.249 (4.95)*** 
  [0;0.938] [0;0.953]   [0.249] [0.247]   
PROFIT 0.043 0.064 (-5.581)*** 0.065 0.085 (-5.37)*** 
  [-0.234;0.435] [-0.334;0.568]   [0.1] [0.135]   
AGE 2.89 3.046 (-4.617)*** 2.897 3 (-4.32)*** 
  [1.099;4.771] [1.099;4.5]   [0.743] [0.724]   
GROWTH 1.043 1.039 (1.325) 1.109 1.057 (4.14)*** 
  [0.186;4.003] [0.117;2.671]   [0.47] [0.299]   
CASH 0.037 0.069 (-8.946)*** 0.097 0.127 (-6.34)*** 
 [0;0.716] [0;0.764]  [0.143] [0.153]  
LEV 0.647 0.623 (1.476) 0.596 0.596 (0.28) 
  [0.007;0.976] [0.044;0.973]   [0.248] [0.224]   
              
Group characteristics             
GROUPSIZE 11.05 11.96 (-17.334)*** 11.29 12.24 (-19.72)*** 
  [9.470;15] [8.989; 17.32]   [1.142] [ 1.71]   
GROUPROA 0.054 0.067 (-6.237)*** 0.067 0.074 (-4.49)*** 
  [-0.068;0.251] [-0.167; 0.304]   [0.0607] [0.07]   
GROUPAGE 2.833 3.258 (-9.236)*** 2.91 3.214 (-9.10)*** 
  [0;4.905] [0;5.517]   [0.986] [0.981]   
GROUPCASH 0.0637 0.0582 (4.897)*** 0.1040 0.0883 (4.86)*** 
  [0.004;0.508] [0.001;0.485]   [0.109] [0.093]   
GROUPLEV 0.691 0.653 (3.476)*** 0.659 0.642 (2.62)** 
  [0.137;0.0.97] [0.149;0.975]   [0.184] [0.180]   
              
Distance and legality metrics             
GEODISTANCE - 0.000 - - 5.407 - 
    [4.932;7.407]     [0.764]   
CULTDISTANCE - 0.280 - - 3.959 - 
    [2.633;4.535]     [0.510]   
LEGALITY1 - 0.064 - - 21.210 - 
    [17.131;21.673]     [1.012]   
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LEGALITY2 - 3.046 - - 3.411 - 
    [0.780;4.193]     [0.552]   
              
Notes: 
This table contains summary statistics and univariate test statistics for the firm-level and group-level characteristics 
based on financial statements of the domestic and foreign sample for the fiscal years 1998-2007. Both samples contain 
723 firms. All firm characteristics are winsorized at the 1% level. The left-hand side reports the medians, the minimum 
and maximum between brackets for both samples, followed by the Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney 
tests for the equality of medians. The right-hand side reports the means, standard deviations between brackets and 
statistics for the t-test for the equality of means across both samples. Variable definitions can be found in Table A1. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 3 
Base Equations 
  Domestic    Foreign    Full 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
                
FOREIGN - -   - -   -0.087*** 
              [0.0062] 
SIZE 0.095*** 0.088***   0.097*** 0.058***   0.098*** 
  [0.001] [0.000]   [0.001] [0.000]   [0.0009] 
TANGIBILITY 0.486*** 0.304***   0.493*** 0.323***   0.483*** 
  [0.018] [0.008]   [0.017] [0.008]   [0.0133] 
PROFIT -0.114** -0.346***   -0.328*** -0.373***   -0.254*** 
  [0.045] [0.020]   [0.032] [0.014]   [0.0270] 
AGE -0.011*** -0.013***   0.008** -0.026***   -0.005** 
  [0.004] [0.001]   [0.003] [0.001]   [0.0026] 
GROWTH -0.011 0.003   0.058*** 0.044***   0.004 
  [0.008] [0.003]   [0.010] [0.003]   [0.0065] 
CASH -0.201*** -0.132***   -0.622*** -0.520***   -0.398*** 
  [0.016] [0.013]   [0.014] [0.013]   [0.0098] 
LEV 0.227*** 0.296***   0.246*** 0.114***   0.242*** 
  [0.007] [0.006]   [0.007] [0.007]   [0.0051] 
GROUPSIZE -0.043*** -0.002***   -0.057*** -0.049***   -0.053*** 
  [0.001] [0.000]   [0.001] [0.000]   [0.0007] 
GROUPROA -0.433*** -0.427***   -0.168** -0.177***   -0.204*** 
  [0.080] [0.035]   [0.069] [0.031]   [0.0539] 
GROUPAGE -0.006* -   -0.019*** -   -0.009*** 
  [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.0024] 
GROUPCASH -0.468*** 0.087***   -0.503*** -0.061***   -0.478*** 
  [0.022] [0.026]   [0.017] [0.021]   [0.0134] 
GROUPLEV 0.383*** 0.346***   0.257*** 0.216***   0.298*** 
  [0.009] [0.012]   [0.008] [0.009]   [0.0053] 
Constant -3.574*** -1.861***   -1.431*** -0.310***   -1.900*** 
  [0.012] [0.004]   [0.011] [0.004]   [0.0085] 
                
Observations 1,887 1,887   1,742 1,742   3,629 
Ind & time dummies Y Y   Y Y   Y 
Parent dummies N Y   N Y   N 
Parent clustering Y Y   Y Y   Y 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is bank debt to total liabilities. CASH, LEV, GROUPLEV and GROUPCASH are residuals 
from auxiliary ordinary least square regressions of these variables on the other firm characteristics. Variable definitions 
can be found in Table A1. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The specifications are estimated using Tobit 
regressions including industry and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for potential clustering at parent 
level are reported between brackets *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * 
denotes significance at the 10% level 
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Table 4 
Extended Analysis: the Effects of Parent Firm Nationality  
  Foreign Sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) 
                        
GEODISTANCE -0.020*** - -0.025***   - - - - -   -0.012*** 
  [0.0021]   [0.0021]               [0.0021] 
CULTDISTANCE - -0.024*** -0.031***   - - - - -   -0.064*** 
    [0.0029] [0.0029]               [0.0029] 
LEGALDISTANCE1 - - -   -0.103*** - - - -0.102***   -0.077*** 
          [0.0078]       [0.0079]   [0.0080] 
LEGALDISTANCE2 - - -   - -0.061*** - - -   - 
            [0.0075]           
LEGALITY1 - - -   - - 0.013*** - -   - 
              [0.0005]         
LEGALITY2 - - -   - -   0.013*** 0.012***   0.050*** 
                [0.0033] [0.0032]   [0.0033] 
                        
SIZE 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.097***   0.098*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.098***   0.098*** 
  [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]   [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]   [0.0013] 
TANGIBILITY 0.492*** 0.494*** 0.493***   0.493*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.493*** 0.493***   0.495*** 
  [0.0175] [0.0176] [0.0177]   [0.0173] [0.0172] [0.0176] [0.0176] [0.0176]   [0.0179] 
PROFIT -0.327*** -0.322*** -0.320***   -0.322*** -0.318*** -0.331*** -0.330*** -0.324***   -0.315*** 
  [0.0321] [0.0322] [0.0323]   [0.0316] [0.0317] [0.0321] [0.0322] [0.0319]   [0.0323] 
AGE 0.007** 0.008** 0.008**   0.008** 0.009** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008**   0.008** 
  [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0035]   [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0035]   [0.0036] 
GROWTH 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.055***   0.057*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058***   0.054*** 
  [0.0097] [0.0098] [0.0099]   [0.0096] [0.0095] [0.0098] [0.0098] [0.0097]   [0.0100] 
CASH -0.617*** -0.624*** -0.619***   -0.625*** -0.629*** -0.615*** -0.618*** -0.622***   -0.615*** 
  [0.0141] [0.0143] [0.0143]   [0.0141] [0.0139] [0.0143] [0.0144] [0.0143]   [0.0145] 
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LEV 0.245*** 0.243*** 0.242***   0.238*** 0.238*** 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.239***   0.238*** 
  [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0071]   [0.0072] [0.0073] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0073]   [0.0073] 
GROUPSIZE -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.055***   -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056***   -0.055*** 
  [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]   [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]   [0.0009] 
GROUPROA -0.172** -0.164** -0.169**   -0.198*** -0.183*** -0.171** -0.169** -0.198***   -0.187*** 
  [0.0698] [0.0699] [0.0705]   [0.0692] [0.0689] [0.0699] [0.0699] [0.0701]   [0.0711] 
GROUPAGE -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020***   -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020***   -0.020*** 
  [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]   [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]   [0.0032] 
GROUPCASH -0.498*** -0.510*** -0.506***   -0.494*** -0.488*** -0.507*** -0.502*** -0.493***   -0.507*** 
  [0.0167] [0.0171] [0.0168]   [0.0169] [0.0167] [0.0168] [0.0169] [0.0169]   [0.0168] 
GROUPLEV 0.252*** 0.254*** 0.247***   0.249*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.257*** 0.249***   0.241*** 
  [0.0076] [0.0075] [0.0076]   [0.0077] [0.0076] [0.0077] [0.0076] [0.0078]   [0.0078] 
Constant -1.273*** -1.296*** -1.059***   -1.433*** -1.336*** -1.731*** -1.493*** -1.491***   -1.200*** 
  [0.0116] [0.0116] [0.0118]   [0.0113] [0.0113] [0.0116] [0.0116] [0.0116]   [0.0119] 
                        
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742   1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742   1,742 
Ind & time FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y   Y 
Parent clustering Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y   Y 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is bank debt to total liabilities. CASH, LEV, GROUPLEV and GROUPCASH are residuals from auxiliary ordinary least square regressions of these variables 
on the other firm characteristics. Variable definitions can be found in Table A1. All firm characteristics are winsorized at the 1% level. The specifications are estimated using Tobit 
regressions including industry and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for potential clustering at parent level are reported between brackets. *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 
Robustness Tests 
  Full sample   Foreign Sample 
VARIABLES (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
FOREIGN -0.091***                 
  [0.0063]                 
GEODISTANCE     -0.024***           -0.025*** 
      [0.0021]           [0.0021] 
CULTDISTANCE       -0.024***         -0.070*** 
        [0.0029]         [0.0029] 
LEGALDISTANCE1         -0.106***       -0.141*** 
          [0.0128]       [0.0130] 
LEGALDISTANCE2           -0.076***       
            [0.0081]       
LEGALITY1             0.011***     
              [0.0006]     
LEGALITY2               0.009*** 0.048*** 
                [0.0033] [0.0033] 
                    
SIZE 0.099***   0.098*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 
  [0.0009]   [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0013] 
TANGIBILITY 0.481***   0.489*** 0.492*** 0.490*** 0.488*** 0.490*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 
  [0.0135]   [0.0177] [0.0178] [0.0175] [0.0174] [0.0177] [0.0178] [0.0180] 
PROFIT -0.254***   -0.328*** -0.323*** -0.325*** -0.318*** -0.331*** -0.329*** -0.316*** 
  [0.0273]   [0.0322] [0.0323] [0.0318] [0.0318] [0.0323] [0.0323] [0.0323] 
AGE -0.005**   0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
  [0.0027]   [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0034] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0036] 
GROWTH 0.002   0.053*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 
  [0.0067]   [0.0098] [0.0099] [0.0097] [0.0097] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0100] 
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CASH -0.387***   -0.600*** -0.607*** -0.611*** -0.615*** -0.600*** -0.603*** -0.605*** 
  [0.0099]   [0.0142] [0.0144] [0.0142] [0.0139] [0.0144] [0.0144] [0.0145] 
LEV 0.242***   0.248*** 0.246*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.236*** 
  [0.0051]   [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0073] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0072] 
GROUPSIZE -0.054***   -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.054*** 
  [0.0007]   [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
GROUPROA -0.217***   -0.172** -0.166** -0.194*** -0.181*** -0.172** -0.171** -0.190*** 
  [0.0545]   [0.0702] [0.0703] [0.0698] [0.0693] [0.0703] [0.0703] [0.0713] 
GROUPAGE -0.007***   -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
  [0.0025]   [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032] 
GROUPCASH -0.467***   -0.471*** -0.482*** -0.472*** -0.459*** -0.480*** -0.475*** -0.487*** 
  [0.0135]   [0.0166] [0.0171] [0.0169] [0.0166] [0.0168] [0.0169] [0.0168] 
GROUPLEV 0.299***   0.252*** 0.253*** 0.250*** 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.256*** 0.239*** 
  [0.0054]   [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0080] [0.0078] [0.0079] [0.0079] [0.0079] 
CORE -0.038***   -0.057*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.055*** 
  [0.0057]   [0.0075] [0.0076] [0.0075] [0.0075] [0.0076] [0.0076] [0.0076] 
DIV 0.013***   0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 
  [0.0046]   [0.0061] [0.0062] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0062] 
YIELDSPREAD -0.136***   -0.041 -0.073*** -0.001 -0.010 -0.060** -0.076*** 0.116*** 
  [0.0294]   [0.0252] [0.0254] [0.0280] [0.0263] [0.0252] [0.0253] [0.0281] 
Constant -1.883***   -1.312*** -1.351*** -1.511*** -1.395*** -1.754*** -1.526*** -1.125*** 
  [0.0088]   [0.0117] [0.0118] [0.0115] [0.0115] [0.0118] [0.0118] [0.0119] 
                    
Observations 3,629   1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 
ind & time FE Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
parent clustering Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R2 0.346   0.385 0.384 0.384 0.386 0.384 0.384 0.390 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is bank debt to total liabilities. CASH, LEV, GROUPLEV and GROUPCASH are residuals from auxiliary ordinary least square regressions of these variables 
on the other firm characteristics. Variable definitions can be found in Table A1. All firm characteristics are winsorized at the 1% level. The specifications are estimated using Tobit 
regressions including industry and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors corrected for potential clustering at parent level are reported between brackets. *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
